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ECHAZABAL V. CHEVRON: A DIRECT THREAT TO
EMPLOYERS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Deborah Leigh Bender
Abstract: Although Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in part
to protect disabled individuals from paternalism, the ADA permits employers to adopt a
requirement that individuals not pose a direct threat to others in the workplace. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has determined that this direct threat defense
also protects an employer who discharges or refuses to hire individuals who pose a direct
threat to their own health or safety in the workplace. In Echazabal v. Chevron, the Ninth
Circuit struck down the EEOC interpretation of direct threat on the ground that it was
paternalistic and inconsistent with the purpose of the ADA. This Note argues that the EEOC
interpretation was reasonable and consistent with the language and underlying purpose of the
direct threat defense. This Note concludes that the Ninth Circuit's rule will force employers to
choose between violating the ADA and knowingly hiring individuals who are at a substantial
risk of injury or death in the workplace.

In the Ninth Circuit, a construction company no longer has the right to
prevent a construction worker with vertigo from working atop a 50-story
high-rise.' Yet that same construction company is also bound by state
safety guidelines that hold the company criminally liable if that
employee tumbles to the ground.2 This employer is stuck between a rock
and a hard place because of the recent decision in Echazabalv. Chevron
USA, 1ne? In Echazabal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)4 prevents employers from considering the health
or safety of a disabled individual when deciding whether that individual
is qualified for a job.' According to the Echazabal court, the ADA
sanctions the use of safety-based qualification standards only to prevent
direct threats to others in the workplace.6 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the direct threat defense only includes threats to others.7

1. This scenario is similar to the hypothetical posed by Chevron's attorneys in their petition for
rehearing en banc. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 13,
Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-55551).
2. See infra Section IIl.
3. 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2001)
(No. 00-1406).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-213 (1994).
5. Echazabal,226 F.3d at 1067-68.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
regulations, however, expressly state that an employer may also invoke
the direct threat defense when the safety of the disabled individual is at
risk.' Congress gave the EEOC an express grant of authority to issue and
enforce regulations implementing the ADA, including this expanded
definition of "direct threat."9 Despite the fact that two other Circuits had
accepted the EEOC's definition," and despite precedent in the Ninth
Circuit establishing an employer's right to use qualification standards
ensuring safe job performance,"' the Ninth Circuit summarily rejected the
EEOC interpretation of direct threat.' The Echazabal court concluded
that the "plain language" of the statute referred to direct threats to others,
not threats to the disabled individual. 3 Moreover, on looking at the
legislative history of the ADA, the court determined that congressional
intent to prevent paternalism in the workplace precluded an interpretation
of the ADA that allowed an employer to make hiring and firing decisions
based upon the safety of the disabled individual. 4
This Note argues that the Echazabal court should have deferred to the
EEOC regulations that define the direct threat defense to include a
substantial risk to the health and safety of the disabled individual in the
workplace. Part I of this Note explains the purpose and scope of Title I of
the ADA and examines the direct threat defense. Part II explores the
regulations and case law that developed under the ADA's predecessor,
the Rehabilitation Act.' Part EJ focuses on California's workplace safety
laws that hold employers criminally liable for knowingly subjecting their
employees to harm. Part IV illustrates the process that a court must go
through before it can reject the kind of agency regulation at issue in
Echazabal. Part V outlines the facts, procedural history, holding, and
rationale of Echazabal. Finally, Part VI argues that the Echazabal court
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(2) (2000).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12,116.
10. See LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998); Moses v.
Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11 th Cir. 1996); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695,
698 (5th Cir. 1995).
11. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1984); Bentevegna v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
12. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.
filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2001) (No. 00-1406).
13. Id. at 1067.
14. Id. at 1067-68.
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1994 & Supp. 2000).

Echazabalv. Chevron
erred in determining that the EEOC interpretation of direct threat was
inconsistent with the text and purpose of the ADA. As a result,
Echazabal has forced employers to choose between subjecting at-risk
individuals to harm and violating the ADA.
I.

TITLE I OF THE ADA PRESERVES AN EMPLOYER'S RIGHT
TO SCREEN FOR QUALIFIED EMPLOYEES

Title I of the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against
disabled individuals. The ADA strikes a balance between the legitimate
interest of disabled individuals in obtaining employment and the
employers' legitimate interest in maintaining a safe workplace. 6 The text
of the Act reflects Congress's intent to prevent the paternalistic exclusion
of disabled individuals from the workplace. Even so, the ADA allows
employers to adopt certain qualification standards that tend to exclude
disabled individuals from the workplace. Employers may adopt any
standard that is job-related and consistent with business necessity, and
they may also adopt a specific standard requiring employees not to pose
a direct threat to others in the workplace. Although the text of the ADA
mentions only direct threats to "others," EEOC regulations state that the
direct threat defense includes threats to the disabled individual as well. A
number of circuits have adopted the EEOC interpretation of the direct
threat defense.
A.

Purposeand Scope of Title I

Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 as a comprehensive mechanism to
end discrimination against disabled individuals in all aspects of life. 7
Title I of the ADA targets discrimination in both public and private
sector employment.' 8 Titles II-IV cover discrimination in state and local
in public
accommodations,
and in
government services,
9
telecommunications, respectively.' Congress found Title I necessary
16. See President George Bush, Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, in 2 PuB. PAPERS: GEORGE BUSH 1990 1070, 1070-71 (1991).
17. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (codified as
amended at42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(1) (1994)).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5) (1994).
19. Id. §§ 12,131-65(b), 12,181-89, 12,201-13; see also Robert L. Mullen, The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: An Introductionfor Lawyers and Judges, 29 LAND & WATER L. REv. 175, 181
(1994).
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because existing laws were inadequate to eliminate workplace
discrimination. 2' For example, the Rehabilitation Act2 ' offered protection
for disabled individuals in public sector jobs, but no federal law
protected disabled workers in the private sector. 2
Before the enactment of the ADA, workplace discrimination
contributed to staggering levels of unemployment and poverty among
persons with disabilities in the United States.23 Congress found that 43
million Americans had one or more disabilities 24 and that these
Americans were "severely disadvantaged" in finding and retaining jobs.25
Two-thirds of these disabled Americans were without employment,
though a large majority wanted to work. 26 Disabled Americans who were
lucky enough to have jobs received unequal pay for their efforts-in
1988, disabled men and women were earning between thirty-six and
thirty-eight percent less than their non-disabled counterparts. In its
findings, Congress stated that this unequal treatment was a result of
"stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
28
such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.
Furthermore, Congress found that if it did not act, this "unnecessary
discrimination and prejudice" would continue to "[deny] people with
disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue
those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous."2 9
Congress enacted Title I of the ADA to address workplace
discrimination based on both real and perceived disabilities.3" Congress
included perceived disabilities under the ADA's protection, recognizing
that social perceptions and myths about disabilities could be as disabling
as the underlying conditions themselves.3 Title I protects qualified
20. H.R. REP. No. 101-485,pt. 2, at 47 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 329.
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
22. H.R. REP No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 47, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 329.
23. Id. at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 314.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(1) (1994).

25. Id. § 12,101(a)(6).
26. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 314.
27. Id. (internal citation omitted).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(7).
29. Id. § 12,101(a)(9).
30. Id. § 12,102(2) (defining "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment").
31. See id.

Echazabalv. Chevron
disabled individuals 2 in all aspects of the employment relationship"3 by
prohibiting discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment-including hiring, advancement, discharge, job training,
and benefits.3 4 The prohibition of discrimination applies to public and
private sector employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and
joint labor-management committees.3 5
B.

The ADA DiscouragesPaternalisticEmployment Decisions

The language and legislative history of the ADA and general
employment discrimination case law state that adverse employment
decisions should not be based on paternalistic concerns about the
employee's welfare. Paternalism is the deliberate interference with an
individual's freedom of choice for "his own good."3 6 In the ADA's
findings section, Congress suggested that paternalism was a cause of
discrimination, resulting in "overprotective rules and policies" that
exclude the disabled. 7 For example, Senator Edward Kennedy
commented that the direct threat defense must not enable employers to
make paternalistic decisions about what is "best" for HIV positive job
applicants.38 Finally, the Committee on Education and Labor noted in its
report to Congress that "[p]aternalism is perhaps the most pervasive form
of discrimination for people with disabilities."39
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
issue of paternalism under the ADA, the Court has rejected paternalistic
justifications for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.40 Specifically, the Court has held that a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) cannot exclude all members of a protected class

32. See infra Section I.C.I.
33. Mullen, supra note 19, at 186.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a).
35. Id. § 12,111(2).
36. Paul Burrows, AnalyzingLegal Paternalism,15 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 489,490 (1995).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(5).
38. 136 CoNG. REC. S9684-03, at S9697 (1990).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 74 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). The Echazabal court suggested that Supreme Court
dicta stating that Title VII prohibits employers from making patemalistic decisions also applies to
the ADA. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.
filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 9,2001) (No. 00-1406).
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out of a paternalistic concern for that protected class's welfare.4' A
BFOQ is a blanket rule that excludes all members of a protected class
because they are either unable to perform an essential function of the job,
or because it is impracticable to distinguish among members of the
protected group.42 For instance, under Title VII, a synagogue may require
that its rabbi be Jewish, despite the fact that this requirement
discriminates against non-Jews based on their religion. The text of Title
VII explicitly provides that employers may utilize such BFOQs.43 Unlike
Title VII, however, the text of the ADA does not provide for the BFOQ
as an employer defense. Thus, it is unclear whether the Title VII case law
condemning paternalism applies to the ADA.44
C.

The ADA PermitsEmployers to Utilize CertainRequirements
Regardless of TheirEffect on DisabledIndividuals in the
Workplace

1.

Requirements that Are Job-Related and Consistent with Business
Necessity

In certain circumstances, an employer may defend the use of
discriminatory qualification standards by using the ADA's business
necessity defense. While requiring employers to include disabled
individuals in the workforce, the ADA's employment protections extend
only to individuals who are "qualified" for a given job. The statute
defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as a disabled individual
who can perform the "essential functions" of a job with or without
reasonable accommodation. 6 Without expressly defining "essential
functions," the statute indicates that courts will consider the employer's
judgment as to which functions are essential.4 7 Moreover, if an employer

41. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977).
42. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 168 (7th ed. 1999).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
44. But see 42 U.S.C. § 12,117 (stating that enforcement mechanisms outlined in Title VII are
applicable to ADA); Muth v. Cobro Corp., 895 F. Supp. 254, 255 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (stating that Title
VII procedures-specifically, enforcement mechanisms-are applicable to ADA actions).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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prepares a written job description before advertising the position or
interviewing applicants, that description carries evidentiary weight as to
the "essential" job functions.48
Employer discretion has limits: an employer may only use
qualification standards that screen out the disabled if the employer shows
such standards are "job-related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity."49 This requirement gives rise to the business
necessity defense under the ADA. Before taking advantage of the
defense, an employer must either make a "reasonable accommodation 50
for the applicant in question or show that accommodating the employee's
disability would impose an "undue hardship" on the business." Thus, the
ADA combats qualification standards that are based on stereotypes but
permits hiring criteria based on the actualattributes of a disability when
those criteria are job-related and consistent with business necessity, and
when the disability cannot be reasonably accommodated. 2 So far, one
circuit has held that an employer may defend the use of safety
requirements under the business necessity defense.53
2.

Requirements that Employees Not Pose a Direct Threat to Others in
the Workplace

The direct threat provision is one example of the kind of permissible
qualification standards envisioned by the ADA's drafters. This provision
allows employers to require that workers not pose a "direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace."' 4 The ADA

48. Id.
49. Id. § 12,1 12(b)(6).
50. Id. § 12,111(9) (stating that "reasonable accommodation" may include altering existing
facilities or restructuring job to accommodate disabled individuals).
51. Id. § 12,111(10)(A) (stating that "undue hardship" is action requiring significant difficulty or
expense); id. § 12,11 1(10)(B) (describing factors considered when determining if accommodation
would pose "undue hardship"); id. § 12,112(b)(6) (stating that the term "discriminate" includes the
use of qualification standards that screen out or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities unless
such qualification standards are job-related and consistent with business necessity).
52. See Amanda Wong, Comment, Distinguishing Speculative and Substantial Risk in the
PresymptomaticJob Applicant: Interpreting the Interpretationof the Americans with Disabilities
Act Direct ThreatDefense, 47 UCLA L REv. 1135, 1141-42 (2000).
53. EEOC v. Exxon, Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(b).
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defines direct threat as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.""5
The legislative history of the ADA explains that the direct threat
defense codified the standard adopted by the United States Supreme
Court under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.56 In School Board of Nassau
County, Floridav. Arline,57 the school board fired an elementary school
teacher because it feared that her recurring bouts of tuberculosis would
endanger the health of her students.5 8 The Court faced the issue of
whether Arline was "otherwise qualified" for the job of elementary
school teacher in spite of her possibly contagious tuberculosis. 59 The
Court held that under the Rehabilitation Act a disabled individual is not
otherwise qualified for a job if he or she poses a significant risk of
spreading an infectious disease to others in the workplace and if that risk
cannot be eliminated with a reasonable accommodation.60 Additionally,
the Court explained that whether or not one posed a direct threat was a
question of fact requiring a trial court to conduct an "individualized
inquiry."'" Thus, the direct threat defense involves a significantly higher
burden of proof than does the business necessity defense.62
Like the Arline case, the legislative history to the ADA characterizes
the direct threat defense only in terms of threats to others, not mentioning
threats to self 6 3 However, the legislative history suggests that employers

could defend a qualification standard requiring employees not to risk
their own health or safety in the workplace. In its discussion of medical
examinations, the House Committee on Education and Labor explained
that if a medical exam revealed a "high probability of substantial harm if
the candidate performed the particular functions of the job in question,
the employer could reject the candidate, unless the employer could make

55. Id.§ 12,111(3).
56. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 34, 45-46 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,457,
468-69 (referring to Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
57. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
58. Id. at 276.
59. Id. at 275.
60. Id. at 287-88.
61. Id.
62. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649-50 (1998) (examining Arline's direct threat
language as applied to ADA and holding that to rely on direct threat defense, one must assess risk
using objective evidence rather than good-faith belief that risk exists).
63. See Wong, supranote 52, at 1148-51.
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a reasonable accommodation .... ,,'The phrase "substantial harm"
appears to include harm to self. As an example of the kind of "substantial
harm" that a medical exam might reveal, the Committee mentioned
exposures to toxic and hazardous substances that could have a "negative
effect" on the individual worker.65 Thus, Congress seems to have
contemplated an interpretation of the direct threat defense that included
threats to the disabled individual.
D.

The EEOCInterpretationof the Direct ThreatDefense

1.

EEOCRegulations

Following Congress's mandate, the EEOC has issued substantive
regulations implementing Title I of the ADA.6 6 In these regulations, the
direct threat defense covers threats to the health or safety of the disabled
individual and others.67 To defend the use of exclusionary safety
requirements, employers must utilize the direct threat defense, rather
than the lenient business necessity defense.6" The employer must make
an "individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely
perform the essential functions of the job."69' The assessment must be
based on either the best available objective evidence or a reasonable
medical judgment.70 When assessing this evidence, courts must consider
the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the
likelihood that the harm will occur, and the imminence of the harm.71
With such strict requirements, the EEOC aims to prevent employers from

64. H.1L REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 73-74 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355-56.
65. Id. at 74, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 357.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12,116 (1994); see also Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with
Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (July 26, 1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
C.F.R § 1630).
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(2) (2000) (stating that "qualification standard" may include the
"requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual
or others in the workplace"); id. § 1630.2(r) (stating that "direct threat means a significant risk of
substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or
reduced by reasonable accommodation").
68. Id. Pt. 1630 App. § 1630.15(b) & (c).
69. Id. § 1630.2(r).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Case Law Interpretingthe EEOC Regulations

Prior to Echazabal v. Chevron,73 the courts of appeals that had
considered the direct threat defense agreed that it included threats to self
as well as to others.74 The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have all
relied upon the EEOC regulation that defines the direct threat defense to
include threats to the individual.75 Finally, the Fifth Circuit has held that
safety requirements are permissible qualification standards under the
ADA.76
In Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc.,v the Eleventh Circuit held
that the direct threat defense included both threats to self and threats to
others. Moses, an epileptic man, was discharged because his employer
deemed an assembly-line job to be hazardous to an employee with a
seizure disorder. 78 The trial court granted summary judgment for the
employer on the ground that Moses could not prove that he was not a
direct threat. 79 The court of appeals affirmed this decision, holding that
72. See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,730
(July 26, 1991) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(r)).
73. 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 9,2001)
(No. 00-1406).
74. Two cases analyzing the "direct threat defense" have been published since the Ninth Circuit
rendered its decision in Echazabal.In Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 225 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir.
2000), the Tenth Circuit utilized the EEOC definition of direct threat in holding that an employee
who "wasn't sure if he was going to hurt someone or hurt himself' was not "qualified" under the
ADA. Id. at 1290. In Kalskett v. Larson Mfg. Co., No. C99-3079 MWB, 2001 WL 630024 (N.D.
Iowa June 1, 2001), a district court in Iowa held that, although the direct threat defense only includes
threats to others, an employee who poses a direct threat to himself or herself is not "qualified" under
the ADA. Id. at *21-22. Because this Note argues that Echazabal'sanalysis was wrong in light of
the authority existing at the time of the decision, these cases are beyond the scope of this Note.
75. See LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998); EEOC v.
Amigo, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997) (upholding trial court's determination that suicidal
employee was not qualified to perform essential job function of administering and monitoring
residents' medication); Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996);
Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1995).
76. EEOC v. Exxon, 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000).
77. 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996).
78. Id. at 447-48. The job required Moses to perform a number of tasks: as a "product inspector,"
Moses would sit above fast-moving press rollers; as a "web operator," he sat beneath a conveyor
belt; as a "Hot Splicer Assistant," he worked beside extremely hot exposed machinery. Id.
79. Id. at 447.
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an employer could discharge a disabled employee if the disability posed
a direct threat to his or her own health or safety on the job.8"
Another Eleventh Circuit case, LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House,
Inc.," involved a man with epilepsy who was discharged from his job as
a line cook because he could not perform the job safely.82 The job
involved cooking on a gas flat top grill, using a "fryolater" filled with hot
grease, and operating slicing machines. 3 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding LaChance
unqualified because he could not do the job without risking harm to
himself or others. 4 Affirming the district court's decision, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that LaChance's seizures posed a danger
both to himself and to others, rendering him a direct threat."
As in Moses and LaChance,Fifth Circuit case law regarding the direct
threat defense accepts the EEOC guidelines as a correct interpretation of
the law. In Daugherty v. City of El Paso,8 6 the Fifth Circuit found, as a
matter of law, that an insulin-dependant diabetic was not qualified to
drive a city bus because the disability posed a "genuine substantial risk"
of injury to himself or others. 7 While the court was not confronted with
a situation where a disabled individual posed a threat only to his or her
own safety, the court suggested that it would recognize an employer
defense on this basis. 8 The court reasoned that because the
Rehabilitation Act term "qualified individual" includes a personal safety
requirement and because Rehabilitation Act standards apply to the ADA,
the ADA necessarily
permits employers to have the same personal safety
89
requirement
The Fifth Circuit also allows an employer to defend safety-based
qualification standards either under the direct threat defense or the more
lenient business necessity defense. In EEOC v. Exxon Corp.,90 the Fifth

80. Id.
81. 146 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 1998).
82. Id. at 834.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 836.
86. 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
87. Id. at 698.

88. See id.
89. Id.
90. 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Circuit examined a job requirement at Exxon that prevented anyone with
a history of substance abuse from working in certain high-risk jobs.9
First, the court noted that Congress had used permissive language to
designate the direct threat defense as an example of one discrete
qualification standard permitted by the ADA.92 As such, the Exxon court
suggested that the permissive phrase "may include.., direct threat[s] to
others" would not prevent employers from having qualification standards
that mandate personal safety.93 Second, the court permitted Exxon to use
the business necessity defense, as opposed to the direct threat defense, to
defend its refusal to hire ex-substance abusers. 94 In doing so, the court
reasoned that safety
requirements were "not exclusively cabined into the
95
direct threat test.
Before Echazabal,the only court to hold that the direct threat defense
did not include threats to the disabled individual was a district court in
the Seventh Circuit. In Kohnke v. Delta Airlines,96 the court reasoned that
the EEOC's broad interpretation of direct threat would render
meaningless the statutory language describing threats to the health or
safety of "other individuals."97 However, Kohnke did suggest that
potential harm to self could be relevant to a defense of business
necessity." Specifically, the court suggested that if the employer found
that a particular disability gave rise to injuries on the job, that fact could
serve as evidence that an exclusionary qualification standard was "job
related and consistent with business necessity." 99
II.

UNDER THE REHABILITATION ACT, EMPLOYERS COULD
DISCHARGE EMPLOYEES WHO RISKED INJURY OR
ILLNESS ON THE JOB

Prior to the ADA, case law and regulations under the Rehabilitation
Act allowed employers to exclude disabled individuals who posed a risk
91. Id. at 872.
92. Id. at 873; (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(b) (2000) (stating that qualification standards "may
include" requirement that employees not pose direct threat to others)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 875.
95. Id. at 873.
96. 932 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. 111.
1996).
97. Id. at 1111 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(b)(1994)).
98. Id. at 1113.
99. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(a)(1994)).
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of injury to themselves or future illness while working on the job.
Because much of the Rehabilitation Act was incorporated in the ADA,
courts often look to Rehabilitation Act law to interpret the ADA.
A.

The RehabilitationAct of 1973 ContributedSignificantly to the
ADA

Enacted in 1973, the Rehabilitation Act"' was the predecessor to the
ADA.' Unlike the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in both public
and private sectors,"' the Rehabilitation Act targets discrimination
against disabled individuals only in programs and activities run by a
federal executive agency, the United States Postal Service, or any
organization receiving federal funds.0 3 Like the ADA, the Rehabilitation
Act aims to guarantee equal opportunity to disabled individuals."0 a To
achieve these ends, the Rehabilitation Act aims to level the playing field
for disabled persons who, despite a disability, have all the qualifications
necessary for a given job. Specifically, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act prohibits employers from discriminating "solely by reason of...
disability [against] otherwise qualified individual[s] with a disability."'0 5
Similar to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act does not force employers to
hire or retain disabled individuals who are not "otherwise qualified" for
the job."0 6 The Rehabilitation Act's legislative history provides evidence
of Congress's intent to balance the realities of employment and the needs
of the disabled.0 7
Rehabilitation Act case law applies to the direct threat defense
because the ADA expressly requires agencies such as the EEOC to
enforce the ADA in a manner that does not conflict with Rehabilitation

100. Pub. L 93-112 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1994 & Supp. 1999)).
101. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 26 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 445,449 (stating
that ADA "completes the circle begun in 1973 with respect to persons with disabilities by extending
to them the same civil rights protections provided to women and minorities beginning in 1964").
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5) (1994).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000).

104. See id. § 701(b)(1)(F).
105. Id. § 794(a).
106. See, e.g., S.E. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (defining "otherwise qualified
person" as one who meets all of a program's requirements in spite of disability).
107. See 124 Cong. Rec. 5950 (1978) (statement of Representative Hyde) ("The Congress needs
to give thoughtful and wide-ranging consideration to the needs of such handicapped persons,
balanced against the realities of economics, public safety, and commonsense.").
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Act standards. 8 The ADA's legislative history indicates that Congress
intended courts and administrative agencies to utilize Rehabilitation Act
precedent when interpreting the ADA." 9 The legislative history also
indicates that Congress intended that the ADA concept of a qualified
individual with a disability be comparable to the definition found in the
Rehabilitation Act regulations."' Although Congress amended the
Rehabilitation Act in 1992 to provide that the same standards apply to
both it and the ADA, the amendment did not limit the applicability of
Rehabilitation Act precedent to ADA claims."' Courts in eleven circuits
continue to apply Rehabilitation Act case law when interpreting the
2
ADA.
B.

Agency Regulations Define "Otherwise Qualified" Under the
RehabilitationAct

Two executive agencies have determined that employees who risk
injury to themselves or others are not "otherwise qualified" for protection
under the Rehabilitation Act. Although the Rehabilitation Act itself does
not define the phrase "otherwise qualified,"". 3 Congress gave all
executive agencies an express grant of authority to implement the terms
of the Act." 4 Both EEOC and Department of Labor (DOL) regulations
108. 42 U.S.C. § 12,117(b) (1994); see also Johnson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 943 F. Supp. 1108, 1114
n.2 (D. Minn. 1996).
109. Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1995).
110. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 33 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 455
(citing 42 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1977)); See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337.
111. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
112. See, e.g., Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir.
1999); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 284 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997); Crawford v. Ind. Dep't of
Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 1997); Yin
v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1996); Allison v. Dep't of Corr., 94 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir.
1996); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 31 n.4 (1st Cir. 1996); McDonald v. Pa. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 697-98 (5th Cir.
1995); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942-43 (10th Cir. 1994); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs.,
Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 213 n.1(4th Cir. 1994).
113. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(20), 794 (1994 & Supp. 2000). Although § 794 speaks of an
"otherwise qualified individual with a disability... as defined in section 705(20)," §705(20) deals
solely with the definition of an "individual with a disability." Id. The "otherwise qualified" language
is not defined in this, or any other, section of the statute.
114. Pub. L. 95-602 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
Amending the Rehabilitation Act in 1978, Congress inserted language in § 794(a) prohibiting
discrimination under any program or activity conducted by any Executive Agency or by the United

Echazabalv. Chevron
have permitted employers to use safety-based criteria to determine
whether an employee is qualified."' The EEOC defined "qualified
individual with handicaps" as someone who could perform all essential
job functions without risking the health or safety of the individual or
others 1 6 Similarly, the DOL guidelines for "job qualifications" permit
exclusionary qualification standards where the qualifications are jobrelated and consistent with both business necessity and "safe
performance.... The phrase "safe performance" is susceptible to a broad
interpretation, which can allow employers to consider the safety of both
the disabled individual and others. Thus, according to the plain language
of these two regulations, the Rehabilitation Act appears to permit
employers to mandate personal safety as a job requirement."'
C.

The Ninth CircuitHas Recognized a Defense Based on Personal
Safety Under the RehabilitationAct

The Ninth Circuit has twice recognized a narrow defense under the
Rehabilitation Act for employers who exclude from the workplace
individuals who pose health or safety threats to themselves on the job. In
Bentivegna v. DOL,"9 the Ninth Circuit examined the DOL regulation
permitting job requirements that exclude disabled individuals because of
their disability when necessary for "safe performance."'"2 Bentivegna, a
diabetic, repaired buildings for the City of Los Angeles.' Concerned for
the personal safety of its workforce,"z the City adopted a requirement
that all diabetic employees must "control" their blood sugar levels."
States Postal Service and requiring the heads of these agencies to promulgate regulations prohibiting
discrimination. Id.
115. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a)(6)
(2000) ("qualified individual with handicaps"); Dep't of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 32.14
(2000) (job qualifications).
116. Id. § 1614.203(a)(6).
117. Id. § 32.14.
118. See id. §§ 32.14, 1614.203(a)(6). Some agencies discussed employment qualifications
without reference to safety, instead focusing on the "essential functions" of the job; however, these
agencies never explicitly prohibited employers from considering threats to safety. See, e.g., id.
§ 85.3; 24 C.F.R. § 8.3.
119. 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
120. Id. at 621 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(b) (1982)).
121. Id. at 620.
122. Id. at 622.
123. Id. at 620.
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Pursuant to this rule, the City discharged Bentivegna when he failed to
control his blood sugar level.' 24 The court concluded that as an employer,
the City could consider its employees' risk of future injury or long-term
health problems, but that it must present adequate evidence of a direct
connection between the disability and the safety concern to rely on the
defense. 2 In Bentevegna's case, the court held that no direct connection
existed between the control requirement and the employer's concern for
either business necessity or safe job performance.' 26
Two years later, in Mantolete v. Bolger,'2 7 the Ninth Circuit created a
strict legal standard to determine when a particular safety requirement
could disqualify a disabled individual. After a pre-employment physical
revealed that Mantolete had epilepsy, the Post Office denied her a job
operating a letter-sorting machine out of concern that the machine's
flashing lights might trigger seizures and injure her.' The court agreed
that a job requirement could screen out a qualified disabled individual on
the basis of a possible future injury, but only when the employer
established a "reasonable probability of substantial harm"'29 based on the
applicant's work and medical histories. 30 Even though the Rehabilitation
Act regulations permitted employers to exclude at-risk disabled
individuals from the workplace,' the Ninth Circuit limited the scope of
the defense by requiring proof of potential harm. 3 In this way, the court
helped ensure that safety-based qualification standards would not be used
as a means for employers to discriminate against disabled individuals.
ll.

STATE WORKPLACE SAFETY LAWS REQUIRE
EMPLOYERS TO PREVENT KNOWN RISKS IN THE
WORKPLACE OR FACE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

If an employer knows that a disabled employee faces an increased risk
of personal injury on the job and that employee is subsequently injured,

124. Id.
125. Id. at 621-22.
126. Id. at 622-23.
127. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
128. Id. at 1419.
129. Id. at 1422.
130. Id. at 1423.
131. 29 C.F.R. §§ 32.14, 1614.203(a)(6) (1985).
132. See Mantolete, 767 F.2d at 1423.
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the employer could face criminal liability under state workplace safety
laws. Nearly all of the states in the Ninth Circuit have strict safety laws
that impose harsh criminal sanctions on employers who are in violation
of these codes. 33 Because Echazabal discussed California's safety
laws,' 34 this Section focuses primarily on the California Labor Code.
The California Labor Code requires employers to provide safeguards
for employees and to do everything else "reasonably necessary" to
protect them.'35 Because the term "safeguards" is defined broadly,
employers are expected to use "any practicable method" to protect
employees.136 Moreover, the Code seems to require employers to
consider the safety of not just the average employee, but each employee
individually.'3 7 An employer's failure to take necessary precautions to
protect its employees' lives, safety, and health is a code violation. 38
The California Labor Code further requires employers to prevent
employees from going into or working in an environment that "is not
safe and healthful."'3 9 The Code places the primary responsibility for the

133. Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington have
adopted the same general workplace safety requirement: employers must furnish employment and a
workplace that is safe and free from recognized hazards. ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.075 (Michie 2000);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-403 (West 2000); CAL. LAB. CODE § 6403 (West 2000); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 396-6 (Michie 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-71-201(1) (2000); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. 618.375(1) (Michie 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 654-010 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.17.060 (West 2000). In these states (with the exception of Montana), if an employer knowingly
violates the general safety requirements and an employee dies as a result, the employer can be
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor and is subject to a fine and jail time. ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.60.095; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-418; CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 6423, 6432(a); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 396-10; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 618.685; OR. REV. STAT. § 654-991(1); WASH. REV.
CODEANN. § 49.17.190(3).
134. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1067--68 (9th Cir. 2000),petitionfor cert.
filed, 69 U.S.LW. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 9,2001) (No. 00-1406).
135. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6401 (2000).
136. Id. § 6306(b) (2000).
137. Id. § 6309 (stating that administrative agency may take action if it "learns or has reason to
believe that any employment or place of employment is not safe or is injurious to the welfare of any
employee") (emphasis added).
138. Id. § 6403:
No employer shall fail or neglect to do any of the following: (a) To provide and use safety
devices and safeguards reasonably adequate to render the employment and place of employment
safe; (b)To adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render the
employment and place of employment safe; (c) To do every other thing reasonably necessary to
protect the life, safety, and health of employees.
139. Id. § 6402.
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safety of workers upon the employer. 4 As a result, the law is necessarily
paternalistic because it requires that the employer not permit any
employee to work in an unsafe environment-even if that employee
wants to work there.
An employer who violates California's Labor Code safety provisions
can be charged with a misdemeanor.' If an employee dies as a result of
such a violation, his or her employer can be charged with involuntary
manslaughter.' The employer could also be charged with involuntary
manslaughter if it places an employee in a position "which might
produce death.., without due caution and circumspection," and the
employee dies as a result.'
If an employer knows that a disabled
employee faces a significant risk of death on the job, these laws may
require the employer to keep the employee out ef the workplace or face
criminal sanctions.
IV.

COURTS USE COMMON TOOLS OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION WHEN DECIDING WHETHER TO REJECT

AN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
The Chevron doctrine, coupled with traditional rules of statutory
construction, helps courts decide whether to follow an agency's
interpretation of a statute. In Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,"' the United States Supreme Court created a twostep process by which a court can determine how much deference to give

140. Bendix Forest Prod. Corp. v. Div. of Occupational Safety & Health, 600 P.2d 1339, 1343-44
(Cal. 1979) (holding that Division of Industrial Safety had authority to issue order requiring
employer to furnish protective gear at employer's expense).
141. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6423 (stating that employer commits misdemeanor by "[k]nowingly
or negligently" committing "serious violation" of labor code); id. § 6432 (stating that "serious
violation" exists if a "substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
142. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (2000); see People v. Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146, 155 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (defining involuntary manslaughter as commission of act involving high degree of risk
of death or great bodily injury, committed with criminal negligence, and defining criminal
negligence as departure from conduct of ordinarily prudent person under same circumstances so as
to be incompatible with proper regard for human life); Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 197
Cal. Rptr. 3, 7-8, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 471-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that corporate
employer may be prosecuted for manslaughter in death of employees under existing law).
143. Somers v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634, 32 Cal.App.3d 961, 967 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973).
144. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Echazabal v. Chevron
an agency regulation.'45 In step one of the process, the court decides
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
'
The court will proceed to the second step of the Chevron
issue."146
analysis only if it finds an ambiguity in the statute. 147 Step two of the
process requires the court to determine whether the agency regulation is
"permissible.' 4 8
In the first step of the Chevron analysis, a court examines the statute
to decide if the language clearly resolves the dispute at issue or if there is
an ambiguity in the text. 49 If the court finds that Congress has spoken
directly to that issue, both the court and the agency must give effect to
that unambiguous statement of Congress and there the matter ends. 5 "A
statute is ambiguous if it gives rise to more than one reasonable
interpretation."'' When assessing such ambiguities, courts must examine
"the language of the statute"'152 by reading the statute as a whole, because
the meaning of the text, whether it appears plain or not, depends on
context. 153
The circumstances underlying the enactment of a particular piece of
legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend the
statutory language to be taken literally. 5 For example, where a literal
interpretation of a statute produces absurd results, courts should avoid
such an interpretation. In McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp.,' the
Eleventh Circuit utilized this cannon of construction when it decided that
a narrow reading of the ADA produced absurd results.'56 Specifically, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the ADA's prohibition of discrimination
"because of' a disability should not be interpreted as prohibiting

145. Id. at 842-43.
146. Id. at 842.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 842-43.
DeGeorge v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 219 F.3d 930, 939 (9th Cir. 2000)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
152. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
153. See King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).
154. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1981).
155. 99 F.3d 1068 (1lth Cir. 1996).
156. Id. at 1075.
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discrimination "solely because of" a disability. 57 The court reasoned that
if the ADA prohibited only discrimination that was "solely because of' a
disability, an employer could fire an individual who was both black and
disabled without incurring any liability under the ADA. 5 8
A court reaches step two of the Chevron analysis only if it has
determined that Congress did not directly address the disputed issue. If
an ambiguity exists within the statute, the court cannot impose its own
interpretation of the statute.159 Instead, the court is to defer to the
agency's interpretation, as long as that interpretation is "based on a
permissible construction of the statute."' 6 ° If Congress expressly
delegated authority to an agency, a court must give agency regulations
controlling weight unless the regulations
are "arbitrary, capricious, or
16
manifestly contrary to the statute."' '
V.

IN ECHAZABAL V. CHEVRON, THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REJECTED THE EEOC'S DEFINITION OF DIRECT THREAT

The Ninth Circuit, applying the Chevron doctrine, decided not to defer
to the EEOC interpretation of the direct threat defense in Echazabal v.
Chevron.'62 The court held that neither the direct threat defense nor the
business necessity defense allow an employer to exclude disabled
individuals who pose a direct threat to themselves on the job. 63 The
United States Supreme Court has not yet decided whether it will grant
certiorari in this case.
A.

Facts andProceduralHistory

In Echazabal,the Ninth Circuit reviewed a summary judgment ruling
that Mario Echazabal had no valid ADA claim against his employer.'64
Echazabal worked as a contract laborer at Chevron's oil refinery in El

157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id.
159. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
160. Id. at 843. A permissible construction must be a "reasonable interpretation." Id. at 844.
161. Id. at 843-44.
162. 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000),petitionfor cert.filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2001)
(No. 00-1406).
163. Id. at 1070, 1072.
164. Id. at 1065.
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Segundo, California between 1972 and 1996.161 In 1992, Echazabal
applied to work directly for Chevron in the same capacity and Chevron
166
offered him a job, "contingent on his passing a physical examination."'
A pre-employment physical exam revealed a liver condition that was
later diagnosed as hepatitis C." 7 Chevron's doctors determined that by
allowing Echazabal to continue working with the liver-toxic solvents and
chemicals present on the job,168 Chevron would be putting his life in
danger. 69 Accordingly, Chevron rescinded its offer, though Echazabal
remained at the refinery as a contract laborer for the next three years. 70
Mr. Echazabal again applied for a permanent position in 1995.171 As
before, Chevron extended the same conditional offer, contingent on the
outcome of a physical exam. 72 Again, Chevron rescinded its offer on
finding that Echazabal's liver might not be able to handle the toxins
present in the refinery."' Ultimately, as a result of the exam, Mr.
Echazabal lost his job at the refinery. 74
After losing his job, Mr. Echazabal filed a complaint with the EEOC
and brought suit in state court. He alleged that Chevron and his contract
employer had discriminated against him based on his disability, and in
doing so violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and California's Fair
Employment and Housing Act. 7 Chevron removed the case to federal
district court and moved for summary judgment on all claims.' 76
Although the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Chevron, 77it certified the case for appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1073 (Trott, J., dissenting) (stating that toxins present on the job included
"hydrocarbon liquids and vapors, acid, caustic, refinery waste water and sludge, petroleum solvents,
oils, greases, and chlorine bleach") (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1065.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.at 1065 &n.l.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Holdingand Rationale

In Echazabal,the Ninth Circuit questioned "whether the direct threat
defense includes threats to one's own health or safety."' 178 The issue was
one of first impression in the Ninth Circuit and, at the time, had received
little treatment in other Circuits. 7 9 The court noted that several cases had
stated, in dicta, that direct threats include threats to the protected
individual. 8 ' After briefly mentioning these cases, the court turned to the
one case that had explicitly held that direct threats include threats to
one's own health or safety: Moses v. American Nonwovens.'8" The court,
however, declined to follow Moses, on the ground that Moses offered no
analysis to support its holding."2
After rejecting all of the case law on point, the court attempted to
resolve the scope of the direct threat defense by examining the language
of the statute. 83 The court stated that the language itself was
"dispositive" and reasoned that because the statute specified direct
threats to others, Congress meant to limit the scope of the defense to
others only.'84
Next, the court invoked the legislative history of the ADA to support
its conclusion that the direct threat provision does not include threats to
disabled individuals.8 5 The court noted that the term direct threat was
used hundreds of times in the legislative history, and in almost every
case was accompanied by a reference to threats to "others."' 8 6 The court
found additional support in committee reports, which indicated that the
direct threat provision was meant to codify the standard set forth in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,8 7 a case that involved only
threats to others.'8 8 Finally, the court referred to a comment made by the
ADA's co-sponsor, Senator Kennedy, stating that the ADA "specifically
178. Id. at 1066.
179. See id.
180. Id. (citing LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.2d 832 (11 th Cir. 1998); EEOC v.
Amigo, 110 F.3d 135 (lst Cir. 1997); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995)).
181. Id. (referencing Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11 th Cir. 1996)).
182. Id.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 1066-67.
Id. at 1067.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

187. 480 U.S. 273 (1987); see supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
188. Echazabal,226 F.3d at 1067.
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refers to health and safety threats to others."' 89 Finding no ambiguity
under the first prong of the Chevron analysis, the court held that
Congress clearly intended to limit the direct threat defense to threats to
others, and rejected the EEOC's contrary interpretation.'
In addition to striking down a defense based on direct threats to the
disabled individual, the court also held that an employer could not use
the business necessity defense to justify excluding disabled employees
who risked injury or illness. 9 ' Initially, the court reasoned that the ability
to perform a job without posing a threat to one's own health or safety
was not an "essential" function of any job. 92 The court deemed such
qualification standards "paternalistic" and inconsistent with the ADA's
underlying policy. 3 The court declined to follow the reasoning of EEOC
v. Exxon Corp.,'94 which held that an employer could defend general
safety requirements using the business necessity defense.19 The court
chose not to follow the case, stating only that the case's factual scenario
involved threats to others, not threats to individuals.'96
Next, the court refused to extend the Ninth Circuit Rehabilitation Act
holdings of Mantolete v. Bolger 97 and Bentivegna v. DOL,'98 which
established that personal safety requirements were valid qualification
standards. 99 Because the Rehabilitation Act did not define "qualified
handicapped person," the Mantolete and Bentivegna courts had applied
an EEOC regulation that permitted them to consider safety of the
disabled individual as a qualification standard."' However, the
Echazabal court noted that the ADA already had a definition of
"qualified individual with a disability" so there was no need to look to
Rehabilitation Act regulations or case law defining that term. 0 ' Noting
that the ADA's definition of "qualified individual with a disability" did
189. Id. (quoting 136 CONG. REC. S9684-03, at S9697 (1990)).
190. Id. at 1069.
191. Id. at 1072.
192. Id. at 1071-72.
193. Id. at 1068, 1071.
194. 203 F.3d 871, 873-75 (5th Cir. 2000).
195. Echazabal,226 F.3d at 1072 n.1 1 (citing Exxon, 203 F.3d at 873-75).
196. Id.
197. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
198. 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982); see supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
199. See Echazabal,226 F.3d at 1071 n.10.
200. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not mention threats to the individual, the Echazabal court concluded that
the ADA definition superceded the Rehabilitation Act's regulatory
definition, rendering both Mantolete and Bentivegna inapplicable to the
ADA.202
Finally, the court dismissed Chevron's argument that employers
would face tort liability if required to hire at-risk disabled individuals,
stating that the issue was not properly before it.2 3 The court briefly

mentioned InternationalUnion, UA W v. Johnson Controls,2° suggesting
that state tort law would likely be preempted where it interfered with
federal anti-discrimination law.2"5 The court, however, did not discuss
whether state criminal laws would be preempted by its interpretation of
the ADA.
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Trott questioned the court's
"bizarre" holding that Mr. Echazabal was "qualified," because
performing the essential functions of his job could kill him. 2 0 6 Judge

Trott asserted that the court's prohibition of paternalism in the workplace
was "pernicious" when used to displace longstanding workplace safety
laws protecting employees.20 7 Judge Trott further noted that the holding
would lead to absurd results: those very workers known to be in danger
would receive the least amount of protection because employers would
be reluctant to exclude them from dangerous work.0 8 Chevron has since
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari to resolve the
issue of whether the direct threat defense includes threats to disabled
individuals.2 9
VI. THE ECHAZABAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DEFERRED TO
THE EEOC'S REGULATIONS
By rejecting the EEOC's interpretation of direct threat that allowed
employers to consider the personal health and safety of disabled

202. Id.
203. Id. at 169-70.
204. 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991) (holding that bona fide occupational qualification cannot exclude
all members of protected class out of paternalistic concern for welfare of protected class).
205. Echazabal,226 F.3d at 1069 (citing Johnson Controls,499 U.S. at 210).
206. Id. at 1073-74 (Trott, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1074 (Trott, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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applicants, the Echazabal court completely disregarded both precedent
and workplace safety concerns. The court erred during step one of the
Chevron analysis by determining that the statute's "plain language"
prevented employers from defending a discrimination claim on the
grounds that the plaintiff posed a safety threat to himself or herself.
Because the ADA's language is ambiguous on this issue, the court
should have proceeded to step two of the Chevron analysis, which
requires the court to defer to an agency regulation unless that regulation
is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Because the
EEOC interpretation of direct threat as including threats to disabled
individuals is a permissible reading of the statute, the court should have
deferred to the regulation. Finally, the court's utter disregard for a jobapplicant's personal safety runs counter to existing workplace safety
laws and forces employers to risk violating either the ADA or state
criminal and labor laws.
A.

The PlainLanguage of the ADA Is Ambiguous on the Topic of
Direct Threats to DisabledIndividuals

Step one of the Chevron process required the Echazabal court to
examine the ADA's text to determine whether or not Congress intended
to permit the exclusion of at-risk disabled individuals from the
workplace.2"' From the statutory text, it is unclear whether Congress
meant the direct threat defense to be the ADA's exclusive safety-based
defense, or whether the direct threat defense was simply an example of
the kind of qualification standard permitted by the ADA. Had it adhered
to the traditional tools of statutory construction, the Echazabal court
would have discovered this ambiguity and, as a result, would have
deferred to the EEOC's interpretation of direct threat.
The language of the statute suggests that the direct threat provision is
an example of one, but not the only, safety-based qualification standard
that the ADA allows."' Initially, the statute provides that employers can
adopt exclusionary qualification standards when those standards are jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.2" Because employers
must obey state workplace safety laws that make it a crime to subject
210. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
211. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc at 11, Echazabal
v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (No.98-55551).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8) (1994).
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employees to known dangers on the job,"1 3 safety is arguably both jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. Thus, an employer could
potentially defend all safety-related requirements under the business
necessity defense. The statute lists the direct threat defense as merely an
example of one acceptable qualification standard, using the permissive
language that employers "may" impose a requirement that employees not
pose a direct threat to others.214 Contrary to Chevron's interpretation, this
example need not prevent an employer from defending other safetybased qualification standards using the business necessity defense.
The Fifth Circuit, in EEOC v. Exxon,21 5 recognized the effect of the
permissive "may" and concluded that safety requirements are not
"exclusively cabined into the direct threat test." ' 6 In effect, the Exxon
court held that if a safety requirement did not fall within the direct threat
defense, an employer could alternatively defend that requirement as a
business necessity.2 7 Although Echazabal disregarded this case because
it dealt with threats to others, the Exxon court suggested its holding
should apply to all safety-based qualification standards-those
protecting the disabled individual and others." 8
The Echazabal court avoided this textual ambiguity by failing to
follow proper canons of statutory interpretation. First, the court focused
entirely on the direct threat provisions to determine the plain meaning of
the statute.21 9 The plain meaning of the statute must be determined by
looking at both the language in question and the entire statutory
context.22" The court should have read the provisions related to the direct
threat defense in conjunction with the ADA section describing those
qualification standards that are consistent with business necessity. 22' If
the court had done so, it could have seen the direct threat defense for
what it was-one example of an acceptable qualification standard.

213. See supra Section III.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(b).
215. 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000).
216. Id. at 873.
217. See id.
218. Seeid. at 874-75.
219. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.
filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619 (Mar. 9,2001) (No. 00-1406).
220. King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).
221. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(6) (1994).
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Second, a restrictive reading of the direct threat defense produces the
sort of absurd results that courts are supposed to avoid.' For example,
the Echazabalcourt's narrow interpretation would force a peanut farm to
hire an individual disabled by a severe peanut allergy to work in its nutpacking facility; a grocery store could not legally discharge a disabled
butcher with hemophilia; and a window-washer disabled by vertigo
could continue working on skyscrapers hundreds of stories above the
ground.2 In his Echazabal dissent, Judge Trott expressed the view that
Congress could not have intended absurd results when codifying the
ADA's direct threat provision.'
Although the Echazabal court read the "plain language" of the direct
threat defense to prevent employers from excluding individuals at risk of
workplace injury, the court could have just as easily concluded that the
ADA preserves for employers the right to discharge such employees as a
business necessity. In this way, the plain language of the ADA is
ambiguous on the issue of whether an employer could exclude a disabled
individual who risked harm to himself or herself on the job.
B.

Under the Arbitrary or CapriciousStandard,the Echazabal Court
Should Have Deferredto the EEOC Guidelines

The EEOC interpretation of direct threat is permissible because it
reconciles the ambiguity in the ADA's text in a way that is consistent
with the ADA's legislative history, the Rehabilitation Act regulations,
and the case law under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
Furthermore, the EEOC interpretation minimizes paternalistic decisions
based on stereotypes. The Chevron doctrine requires a court to defer to
agency regulations that are based on a "permissible" reading of a
statute.' Because Congress gave the EEOC an express grant of
authority to implement Title I of the ADA, 5 the court must accept the

222. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1075 (1lth Cir. 1996); supra notes
155-58 and accompanying text.
223. For a list of similar hypotheticals, see Appellee's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestions for
Rehearing En Banc at 13, Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-

55551).
224. Echazabal,226 F.3d at 1074 (Trott, J. dissenting).
225. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 12,116; see also Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with
Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,526 (July 26, 1991).
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EEOC's regulations unless they are "arbitrary and capricious. ' Since
the EEOC regulations are compatible with the ADA's language,
legislative history, and case law, the Echazabal court should have
deferred to those regulations.
1.

The EEOC's InterpretationofDirect Threat is Consistent with the
ADA 's Text, Legislative History, and Case Law

The EEOC interpretation that the direct threat defense includes threats
to disabled individuals is permissible because the ADA allows employers
to have exclusionary qualification standards that are "job related and are
consistent with business necessity. '228 Ensuring the personal safety of
employees is a business necessity, given that employers are required by
state law to maintain a safe workplace. 229 Thus, it was not arbitrary or
capricious for the EEOC to allow for a qualification standard that
employees not pose a direct threat to self or others in the workplace.
The legislative history supports the assertion that the ADA allows
employers to impose personal safety requirements on their employees.
Although the legislative history normally mentions direct threats within
the context of threats to others,230 the legislative history does explicitly
recognize the existence of threats to self. For example, the House Labor
Committee asserted that the ADA permits an employer to reject a
candidate if a pre-employment medical exam reveals a "high probability
of substantial harm if the candidate performed the particular functions of
the job in question. ' , 23 As an illustration of an acceptable medical exam,
the Committee mentioned that employers could test to determine whether
exposures to toxic or hazardous chemicals have had a "negative effect"
on individual employees.232 Such a test would reveal ailments affecting
primarily the health and safety of each individual. While the Echazabal
court dismissed the Committee's discussion because it did not take place

227. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.

228. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(6).
229. See supra Section III.
230. See Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2000), petitionfor
cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2001) (No. 00-1406) (stating that throughout the
legislative history, the term direct threat is accompanied by a reference to "others" or to "other
individuals" in the workplace).
231. H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 73 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355-56.
232. Id. at 74, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357.
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"in the context of... the direct threat defense,"'23 this legislative history
suggests that employers can consider threats to disabled individuals
under the business necessity defense.
Finally, case law in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits supports the EEOC
interpretation of the direct threat defense. In Moses v. American
Nonwovens,2 4 the Eleventh Circuit explicitly held that the direct threat
defense includes threats to the disabled individual as well as to others."25
In Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 6 the Fifth Circuit explained in dicta
that because the standards for liability are the same for both the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act, and because the Rehabilitation Act
recognized an employer defense based on threats to disabled individuals,
the ADA must also recognize that same defense."2? At the very least,
these cases show that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have found the
EEOC regulations to be reasonable.
2.

The EEOCInterpretationofDirect ThreatIs Consistentwith the
Regulations andNinth Circuit CaseLaw Under the Rehabilitation
Act

Additional support for the EEOC interpretation of direct threat may be
found in Rehabilitation Act regulations and Ninth Circuit case law, both
of which recognize that a disabled individual might not be "qualified" if
he posed a threat to his own health or safety on the job." Because the
ADA's text and legislative history indicate that Rehabilitation Act
precedent applies to the ADA, and because the EEOC regulations are
consistent with the Rehabilitation Act, the EEOC interpretation of direct
threat is not arbitrary or capricious.
Ninth Circuit case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act established
an employer defense for refusing to hire an employee who posed a threat
to his own health or safety in the workplace. In Bentivegna v. United
States Dep "tofLabor,29 a Ninth Circuit panel held that in order to prove

233.
234.
235.
236.

Echazabal,226 F.3d at 1068 n.6.
97 F.3d 446 (1lth Cir. 1996).
Id. at 447.
56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).

237. Id. at 697-98.
238. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a)(6) (2000); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir.
1985); Bentivegna v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 694 F.3d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1982).
239. 694 F.3d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
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an employee unqualified under the "safe performance" requirement, an
employer must show a link between the disability and a possibility of
future injury or health problem.240 In Mantolete v. Bolger,24' the Ninth
Circuit again recognized a defense based on a threat to personal safety
but limited the defense by requiring the employer to make, in each
individual case, an independent medical assessment of the probability
and severity of the potential harm.242 Thus, the Rehabilitation Act's
regulations and case law provided that employers would be able to
exclude disabled individuals who posed a threat to their own personal
safety in the workplace.
The Echazabal court chose to disregard this case law, concluding
instead that the ADA superceded the Rehabilitation Act.243 Specifically,
the court distinguished the cases on the ground that unlike the
Rehabilitation Act, the ADA defined the term "qualified individual with
a disability" and the ADA definition did not mention threats to the
disabled individual. 44 However, the ADA's legislative history evidences
the intent that the ADA should mirror the Rehabilitation Act; in
particular, the term "qualified individual with a handicap" was meant to
be the same as in the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act.245
The EEOC regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act stated that
an employee would not be "qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act if he
could not perform the essential functions of the job without injury to
himself or others.2 46 Likewise, the DOL stated that an employer could
have a job requirement that excluded disabled individuals and still be in
compliance with the2 47Rehabilitation Act, if that requirement provided for
"safe performance.

Moreover, in Daugherty v. City of El Paso,248 the Fifth Circuit stated
that the Rehabilitation Act regulations and case law would apply to the
240. Id. at 622.
241. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
242. Id. at 1422.
243. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1071 n.10 (9th Cir. 2000),petitionfor cert.
filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2001) (No. 00-1406).
244. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 33 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 455 (citing
42 Fed. Reg. 22686 (1977)); See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337.
246. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a)(6) (2000).
247. Id. § 32.14.
248. 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
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ADA.249 Since the cases and regulations under the Rehabilitation Act
provided for a personal safety requirement, that same requirement should
also apply to the ADA. Echazabal should have deferred to the EEOC
interpretation of direct threat because the EEOC definition was
consistent with both the Rehabilitation Act regulations and case law.
3.

The EEOCInterpretationof DirectThreat Reconciles the Statute s
Ambiguous Text in a Way that Minimizes Paternalism

The EEOC interpretation is reasonable because it fairly balances the
competing interests of employers who want workplace safety and
disabled individuals who want to work."s The EEOC regulation prohibits
employers from defending safety-based qualification standards under the
more lenient business necessity defense, as the district court in Kohinke
v. Delta Airlines2" and the Fifth Circuit in EEOC v. Exxon Corp"2
suggested could be done. 3 To plead the direct threat defense, an
employer must make an individualized assessment of one's ability to do
a job safely, based on real medical evidence. 4 The employer must also
show that the risk to self presently exists, that severe harm will result,
and that the harm is both likely and imminent. 5 When defending a
general qualification standard, however, the employer need only show
that the standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity. 6
By including threats to self within the direct threat defense, the EEOC
interpretation prohibits employers from excluding an entire group of
people out of a mere business interest in employee safety, instead forcing
them to defend such exclusions on a case-by-case basis. 7 The
interpretation is consistent with the Rehabilitation Act precedent in
Mantolete v. Bolger, 8 which required an independent medical
assessment of the likeliness and severity of harm before an employer

249. Id. at 698.
250. See Bush, supra note 16, at 1070-71.
251. 932 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
252. 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000).
253. Kohinke, 932 F.Supp. at 1113; Exxon, 203 F.3d at 873.
254. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(r) (2000).

255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See supra Section U.B.1.
258. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
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could label an applicant "unqualified., 25 9 The EEOC interpretation
reconciles concerns about discrimination based on paternalistic
stereotypes with an employer's legitimate need for safety in the
workplace. As a result, the EEOC interpretation limits the number of
paternalistic decisions that will be made, and supports, rather than
undermines, the ADA's underlying policies.
C.

Echazabal Forces Employers to Choose Between Violating the ADA
and ViolatingState Workplace Safety Laws

Recall the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note: A construction
worker with vertigo applies for a job at a California-based construction
company that builds skyscrapers.26 Although the employer could try to
accommodate this employee with the standard harness and safety-rope,
she is still at a greater risk of falling than the average worker. As shown
above, California's Labor Code requires an employer to do everything
"reasonably necessary to protect the life, safety, and health of
employees. '26 If the employer cannot prevent this applicant from
encountering vertigo-triggering heights on the job, the only way to
adequately protect her "life, safety, and health" is not to hire her... or so
a clever prosecuting attorney might argue, after her client's untimely
death on the job. Under a standard requiring the workplace to be "safe
and healthful" for an employee with vertigo, a jury could find the
construction company liable for hiring her in the first place.262
By misreading the statute and incorrectly rejecting the EEOC
interpretation of the direct threat defense, the Echazabalcourt has placed
employers in an untenable position. After Echazabal,the ADA no longer
permits employers to reject individual disabled applicants who are at an
increased risk of injury, but state law still requires employers to comply
with safety requirements.2 63 As a result, employers in the Ninth Circuit
259. Id. at 1422-23.
260. See supra note I and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
263. The Echazabal court did not address the issue of whether its interpretation of the ADA
would preempt state criminal workplace safety laws. See supra Section I.C. While the issue of
preemption is beyond the scope of this Note, it is unlikely that the ADA would preempt criminal
workplace safety laws because such laws fall under the state's traditional police power. Moreover,
the fact that the employer hired the disabled individual would defeat an argument that the ADA's
purpose, to open employment opportunities to persons with disabilities, had been thwarted by
criminal liability.
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who follow the Echazabal ruling and disregard the health and safety of
disabled job applicants will risk criminal sanctions under state workplace
safety laws.
VII. CONCLUSION
The EEOC's direct threat provision, which permits employers to weed
out those employees who are at a heightened risk of on-the-job injury,
strikes a balance between the employer's interest in workplace safety and
the interest of disabled individuals to participate in the workforce. The
Ninth Circuit, in Echazabal v. Chevron, disrupted that balance by
holding that an employer could not, under any circumstance, exclude a
disabled individual from work just to protect that person's health or
safety. Under the Chevron doctrine of deference to agency regulations,
the court should have deferred to any interpretation of "direct threat" that
was reasonable in light of the ADA's text and legislative history. In its
attempt to rid the workplace of paternalism, the court turned its back on
the state and federal safety laws that forbid employers from knowingly
subjecting workers to life-endangering conditions. As a result, employers
now have an ugly choice to make: risk an employee's life or risk a
discrimination suit under the ADA.
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